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Preamble: This paper formulates and defends a version of moral vegetarianism. Since 
eating animals is not causally connected to their death, I begin with analyzing the moral 
status of consumer actions that do not, taken on their own, harm animals (I). I then 
formulate a version of moral vegetarianism (II). Three different opponents of moral 
vegetarianism are then distinguished and criticized (III-VI). I then take up the argument 
according to which eating animals benefits them (VII). I close with the question of the 
desirability of collective vegetarianism from the point of view of animals.  
 
   
The negligible impact of individual action on large scale industries presents a problem for 
moral vegetarianism: since personally refraining from eating animal flesh will not save a 
single animal, endorsing personal vegetarianism does not follow from a belief in the 
immorality of killing animals for food, or a belief in the morality of collective 
vegetarianism. Pro-vegetarians bridge this gap either by arguing that personal action may 
affect large scale outcome (the analogy being voting: negligible impact is 
overwhelmingly likely; yet overwhelming impact is a possibility that justifies personal 
action), or by arguing that consuming products that are made through immoral actions 
                                                 
1 I wish to thank Shuli Barzilai, Stan Godlovitch, Nathan Nobis, Daniel Statman and Eddy Zemach for 
comments and various challenges to previous versions of this paper.  
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exemplifies the wrong kind of virtue (obtuseness, callousness, cruelty), or by 
emphasizing symbolic support and symbolic protest.2  
     Opponents of vegetarianism will avoid formulating this problem as a critique of 
vegetarianism since if one accepts the “Voter’s Paradox” reasoning here—a reasoning 
according to which the benefits of a large scale desired action are causally detached from 
personal action—one is opening a Pandora box. Tax paying, cooperating with a draft, 
personal charitable aid to large-scale goals which one endorses, all become irrational. The 
challenge for vegetarian theory is here not one of answering a critique, but of clarifying 
the connection between consumption and killing when one’s own actions cannot modify 
outcome for future animals.3 General connections between personal action and promoting 
a desirable goal are one type of account that comes to mind. Eddy Zemach, a moral 
vegetarian, tells me that for him, fairness is the notion doing the work here (reducing the 
killing of animals is one’s goal and doing one’s fair share in promoting this goal means 
avoiding eating flesh). Zemach is partly right: such appeal to fairness is a conceptual link 
that operates in numerous cases in which the personal and the collective are linked. But I 
think that we can get closer to the particularities that distinguish the vegetarian example. 
Eating flesh, if one believes that it is collectively wrong, is not merely a case of not doing 
one’s fair share. Nor is the problem merely one of flawed integrity (which may be 
another suggestion regarding what is doing the moral work4).   
     Apart from fairness and integrity, which do partly underlie personal action here, there 
is an additional particular link that distinguishes refraining from meat eating. The most 
promising route to get at the specific moral structure which connects killing animals and 
meat consumption is Curnutt’s attempts to relate to the killing and the consumption as 
two parts of the same wrong.5 Curnutt defends this idea through the principle that it is 
                                                 
2 Nathan Nobis surveys these routes in his “Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does Consequentialism Demand too 
Little?”, Social Theory and Practice, 28. 1. (2002): 135-156. 
3 Some vegetarians believe that their diet personally diminishes the amount of animals killed. While I 
regard this as erroneous wishful thinking, the following argument on a deeper connection between 
consumption and killing is consistent with holding that the vegetarian is also personally effecting animal 
welfare.  
4 Daniel Statman suggested to me that integrity and dis-integrity may be the important aspects here.  
5 Jordan Curnutt, “A New Argument for Vegetarianism”, Journal of Social Philosophy, 28 (1997): 153-72. 
Thomas Regan’s speaks of meat eaters being “causally implicated” in a wrong, but does not discuss the 
special nature of the causal link in his “The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism”, All That Dwells Within, 
University of California Press: Berkeley (1982) 1-39.  
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wrong to cooperate and benefit from a defeat of the basic well being of others. This 
principle explains the wrongness of consumption by tying it with the harm done to the 
animal. But the bond is actually tighter than benefiting or cooperating. It comes out when 
focusing on the philosophy of action implied by Curnutt’s “two parts of the same wrong”. 
Unfortunately, pro-vegetarian literature has here relied on misleading analogies between 
eating animals and using human remains that have been turned into objects (favorite 
examples are using soap or lamps made out of the remains of Jewish victims of the Nazis, 
or finding and wearing a ring made of human bone). Instrumental usage of human body 
parts is a symbolic demeaning of a person after death. Jews were not killed to produce 
soap. The wrong in using such “objects” involves a participation in demeaning a person. 
Such horrid examples also involve disgust, the moral status of which is complex: disgust 
is itself an amoral psychological fact that carries moral implications.6 Using animal for 
food is different. Pleasure rather than disgust is experienced. Another difference is that 
animals are also not perceived as being demeaned by using them for the purpose of 
producing food, clothing or footwear.  
     Better analogies that get us to the operating moral depth structure are watching snuff 
movies, or enjoying art that involves body parts (Melanesian head decoration). Victims of 
snuff movies (I will assume that such movies exist) have been killed so that someone 
would watch them die later. Here the consumption is a completion of the initial action. 
By “completion” I refer to a temporally extended action, in which the part of the action 
done in the past, foresaw and was predicated on an unspecified individual who will 
function in a particular way. By becoming that individual, one completes the action, 
making it whole (another way of articulating this thought, suggested to me by Stan 
Godlovitch, is that by consumption one is commissioning the killing). The snuff movie 
victim was not just killed; she was killed so as someone would watch her die later 
                                                 
6 This last point is shown in Herodotus’ example in the History of the Persian Wars of a society repelled by 
the idea of burial, favoring instead the eating of the dead as a mark of respect for them. I see nothing 
immoral in changed cultural norms in which human remains are used in various ways, soap production 
included. Indeed, commodification of one’s future corpse can be a good way to promote highly important 
goals, like enlarging the available reservoirs of organs for transplanting, thus greatly decreasing present 
suffering and death of living people. Some uses are disturbing or repulsive, and given such responses are 
then immoral; but the responses themselves rest on amoral conventions. We are attached to our bodies, and 
we care what happens to them after we die. This is a fact about present human psychology, and it has moral 
implications. But should we come to see this care as an irrational sentiment, there is nothing immoral about 
using bodies in ways that are less grand than organ transplants. 
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(analogously: the animal was not simply killed; it was killed so it would be worn or eaten 
later). These actions have an extended temporal structure, with a specified beginning with 
particular agents and victims, and a specified end with an undesignated agent, a structure 
that one fully particularizes when one chooses to become that undesignated agent.  
     The immorality of initiating such actions is greater than that of acting as their 
projected consumer not only because they involve the additional harm of motivating, 
initiating, and sometimes institutionalizing immoral practices that invite others in as 
performers of a wrong, but also because of the psychological fact that many can be 
consumers, but will be unable actually confront a suffering victim. But this way of 
looking at things—consumption not as distinct from the initial wrong, but as a carrying 
out of it—does bring out the sense in which consumption and killing are parts of the same 
wrong, regardless of the causal disconnection between consumption and the killing of the 
animal. And this dimension will be important later in this essay.   
    Apart from completing a temporally extended wrong through consumption, there is 
too, the conceptually distinct wrong of participating in a wrong practice, even when one’s 
consumption does not increase suffering. Wearing human-bone rings is an appropriate 
example here, though in our context it conflates between several distinct kinds of harm, 
some of which do not apply in the animal case, so I shall avoid it. A better example is 
paying for services provided by child-prostituting establishment that exist in some 
countries. Doing so does not necessarily intensify the pain or harm done to the children 
involved. The potential client would only be one more indistinguishable client in the long 
day of the child being prostituted. One can even make a difference for the better: say, 
tipping generously or behaving nicer than other clients would. Morally avoiding such 
practices involves the sort of denied participation I am outlining, rather than assumptions 
regarding consequential change brought about through one’s actions. But it is also 
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I have not yet explained why killing animals for food is wrong. My claim is so far this: if 
killing animals for food is a wrong, personal eating of these animals is wrong in both 
senses specified above: it is to complete the initial wrong done to the animal, and it is a 
participation in a wrong practice. This implies the following formulation of moral 
vegetarianism:  
 
Animals should not be killed for food when nutritional 
alternatives are available. To eat animals is to participate in 
and to complete a morally wrong act.  
 
Here are some clarifications of this definition and some non-trivial implications which 
follow from it ("non-trivial" in the sense that they may be contested by other moral 
vegetarians): 
 
a) The emphasis is on refraining from participation in a wrong done to an 
entity, where one’s participation is not taken to be an intensification of the 
harm being done to that entity, but an endorsing of a wrong practice.  The 
focus is on one’s personal relation to what one eats. This definition does not 
rely on causal connections between vegetarianism and a reduction in the 
number of animals raised or killed for food. Nor is there an assumption that 
private vegetarianism will lead to collective vegetarianism or that 
vegetarianism is a causally effective type of protest against the wrongs of 
factory farming, as is assumed, for example, by demi-vegetarians (people who 
do not see anything wrong in killing animals for food, but are appalled by 
factory farming and so eat small quantities of meat thus protesting against 
current farming methods).   
b) No equality is assumed between the value of animal life and sufferings 
and the value of human being’s lives and sufferings. This brand of moral 
vegetarianism does not require a prior belief that specieism is wrong or a 
belief in animal rights.  
c) This formulation of vegetarianism allows for eating and using animals that 
have not died from planned killing for the purpose of eating them. Some 
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vegetarians will disagree here (e.g. Cora Diamond). This position also says 
nothing against raising animals for food. While the vegetarianism I defend 
will avoid participating in current rearing practices as well, the position does 
not include a ban on raising animals for the purpose of eating them after they 
die on their own. While there are excellent culinary and prudential reasons to 
avoid what Sapontzis calls “scavenging”, I do not see a moral reason to do so. 
A more inviting possibility is using fur or leather products that depend on 
animals that have died on their own. There are no prudential reasons to avoid 
this, and no moral reasons to do so either.  
d) Vegetarianism thus construed does not entail veganism. The question of 
the morality of any use of animals for food products differs from use that 
involves killing them. While many uses of animals are wrong, unlike killing 
them, the very use of animals for eggs and dairy is not wrong as such. Using 
animals for these is consistent with their welfare, in the sense that they can 
lead comfortable and painless lives. Here commodification can actually work 
for animals rather than against them, as such creates financial incentives to 
preserve them.7 Since modern factory farming techniques for dairy and eggs 
are extremely cruel, participating in such practices is wrong too. But such ban 
on participation is different. First, this ban prescribes selective consumption, 
which still allows for consumption of egg and dairy products that are raised in 
morally acceptable ways. Second, avoiding egg and dairy because of the 
immoral production practices these rely on now, cannot be conceptualized in 
terms of avoiding completing or participating in a wrong in the same sense of 
the prostituted child or the killed animals example. No reform done to a child-
prostituting establishment will justify participation.8  
e) Vegetarianism thus construed has no implications for the question of 
experimenting on animals or the question of product testing. Some 
experiments are wrong, and consuming products that stem from such 
                                                 
7 On commodifying animals as a benefit to them see R. A. Posner: “Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, 
and Pragmatic Perspectives”, forthcoming in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, Martha 
C. Nussbaum and Cass R. Sunstein eds.   
8 For a detailed analysis and defense of this view, see my “Veganism”, forthcoming in Journal of Social 
Philosophy, Vol. 35 (3): 367-379, 2004.  
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experiments is wrong since it is a participation and completion of a wrong. 
But the case for vegetarianism is morally distinct from the issues involved in 
experimentation because of available substitutes to in vivo testing: most 
scientists claim that virtually all experiments, right and morally dubious ones, 
require killing animals (though surely not the number of animals killed today) 





But is killing animals for food wrong? It is usually thought that vegetarians need to prove 
a number of difficult claims so as to support their position. These include the claim that 
animals are not automata; that animals suffer or experience pain; that killing animals 
harms them; that killing or causing them pain matters to animals in a way that should 
make an ethical difference to us; that animals have some kind of moral status; that we 
have positive or negative obligations with regards to non-human animals or, more 
ambitiously, that animals have rights that in turn call for these negative/positive 
obligations. This way of framing the debate and its major steppingstones has a strong 
hold on the philosophical literature on vegetarianism. But it is a misleading framework. 
The superficiality resides in conflating between arguing about the justifications for 
beliefs that are widely shared, and arguing about the moral consequences implied by such 
beliefs given the fact that they are shared. The immorality of child-torture is, for example, 
predicated on a belief in the existence of other minds, the justification of which has been 
repeatedly contested. Yet since the belief in other minds is widely shared, the implication 
for moral action does not require a proof of this prior claim even if it happens to underlie 
it. By contrast, when the underlying beliefs are not shared, implications for action have to 
await a justification of these (e.g. implications for abortions largely depend on contested 
beliefs regarding the moral and ontological status of the foetus). Since philosophers like 
to justify regardless of the nature of the dispute, the distinction between these two types 
                                                 
9 Literature on alternatives to animal testing casts doubt on this (e.g. Greek C. R and Greek J. S. Sacred 
Cows and Golden Geese: The Human Cost of Experimenting on Animals, 2000, Continuum: London and 
New York.). For my own position on this question, see my forthcoming “Killing for Knowledge”. 
Between the Species IV August 2004 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 8
of debates has faded within the vegetarian debate (that is, debates that depend on 
contested beliefs vs. debates that depend on shared beliefs which have contested 
justifications). This as well as the attempt to ground vegetarianism on a larger theory of 
animal welfare has led to adopting a misleading framework for this specific debate.  
     Distinguishing between beliefs held and beliefs proved can show where disagreements 
between vegetarians and their opponents lies. Virtually everyone, vegetarian or not, will 
agree that there are some moral restrictions on our relations with animals. Anti-cruelty 
legislation and ethical supervision on animal experimentation within research institutes 
are indicative of this shared consensus. Animals should not, for example, be tortured or 
even painlessly killed for an insubstantial reason (think of someone who purchases 
hundreds of healthy cats and dogs just for the purpose of euthanising them painlessly).  
Five non-trivial beliefs are implied by this shared condemnation, and it is important to 
note them as they are sometimes denied in this debate: first, a belief in a morally relevant 
difference between animals and objects: we are morally indifferent to people who slowly 
mince and shred their own furniture, smiling as they do so10; second, a belief in animal 
pain; third, a belief in the moral relevance of animal pain; fourth, a belief that there are 
cases in which such pain should trump even intense human pleasures; fifth, a belief that 
killing animals, painless or not, is a harm done to the killed animal, and that some 
justification for doing so is required.  
    Proving these beliefs is an important task. But disputants in the vegetarian debate make 
two mistakes: first they suppose that proving these is a burden that vegetarians need to 
carry alone. Second, that vegetarians need to carry it at all. Why prove beliefs that 
everyone shares anyway?11 Here the philosopher’s urge to examine the supposedly 
                                                 
10 Some objects, e.g. works of art, historical buildings or natural objects have a moral status too (moral 
status in the sense that there are moral restrictions regarding what may be done to them), though most 
theorists would agree that this status is anthropocentrically derived. Unlike animals, in the case of some 
objects some actions ought not be done because of respect to the concerns of actual or potential humans, 
not because they ought not be done to these objects. Nothing wrong is done to the object. Kant's attempt to 
apply this distinction to animals via his famous direct/indirect duties distinction in his Lectures on Ethics  
was predicated on an identification of animals with means for human welfare, a teleological view going 
back at least to Aquinas, which has no contemporary defenders. Advocates of a non-anthropocentric view 
of objects will disagree with my point here, but can still accept my general argument above.  
11 Note the difference between this argument and a similar one presented by Andrew Tardiff (“Simplifying 
the Case for Vegetarianism”, Social Theory and Practice, 22. 3 (1996): 299-314): Tardiff attempts to use 
intuitions elicited from similar thought experiments so as to argue for vegetarianism. I am distinguishing 
between proving, or arguing for a belief, and showing that it is held. I share Tardiff’s belief that the 
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obvious gets in the way of moral clarity. The philosophers who are interested in animals 
will work hard to prove say, why animal pain matters morally; they will in turn get 
challenged on these arguments by other philosophers, and the ensuing debate will create 
the false impression that the moral status of a contested aspect of the animal issue (here 
vegetarianism), depends on the validity of the proof of this anterior claim. Challenging a 
defender of vegetarianism to prove why painlessly killing an animal harms the animal, is 
as plausible as demanding of a feminist to solve the other minds problem. In one way 
both are reasonable requests: vegetarianism is predicated on a belief in the harm involved 
in animal death in much the same way that feminism is predicated on the assumption that 
other people exist. Philosophers are interested in the problematic basis for these latter 
assumptions. But at the same time these challenges are not to the point as proponents and 
opponents share the beliefs in question anyway, as is shown by the above thought 
experiments.  
     Justifying the condemnation of painless killing of animals is an important question, 
and I do not mean to shortcut it through this argument. My claim, up to this point, is not 
substantive but methodological (I am not, for example, claiming that accepting the above 
five beliefs necessitates adopting moral vegetarianism and will bring up that question 
only in part VI): contesting the justifications of beliefs is different from rejecting these 
beliefs. Put differently, the method I advocate does not rely on deciding the weighty 
matter of moral considerability (or “moral patienthood”) or rights for animals to establish 
vegetarianism. Instead, I appeal to coherence between existing beliefs held by virtually 
all readers of this essay, and then proceed to claim that eating meat does not cohere with 
them. 12
                                                                                                                                                 
vegetarian debate can and should be simplified, in the sense of detaching it from other issues and 
assumptions that literature on animal welfare focuses on. By focusing on the narrow case for vegetarianism 
I do not mean to criticize grander theories of moral considerability that also imply vegetarianism.  
12 Cf. Mark Rowlands’ method in Animals Like Us, Verso: London and New York (2002): 28-31. An 
honorary title for this strategy is “an appeal to moral integrity”. Fairness requires me to mention that the 
other name for such arguments is circumstantial ad hominem. The grand defense of employing such moves 
in philosophy is Johnston’s: all philosophical arguments are of the circumstantial ad hominem kind (Henry 
W. Johnstone, Jr., Validity and Rhetoric in Philosophical Argument: An Outlook in Transition, University 
Park, PA: The Dialogue Press of Man & World, 1978). But relying on circumstantial ad hominem 
arguments is defendable through routs that are more mundane. The fact that many logic text-books classify 
such moves as “fallacies” means that like any non-formal fallacies (for example, appeal to authority), only 
some applications of such moves can be accepted (appealing to a friend’s authority when explaining why 
one takes a pill is implausible; appealing to a physicians authority is not). Aspects of the context usually 
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      Given shared beliefs, one can examine whether one’s conduct is continuous with the 
implications of these beliefs. Obviously, if someone actually rejects one or all of these 
beliefs (as opposed to contesting the justification of them), that will also amount to a 
rejection of vegetarianism. Deny that animals feel pain, and you are on your way to 
denying vegetarianism. Call this “anti-vegetarianism” as distinguished from “non-
vegetarianism”. An anti-vegetarian positively rejects one or more of these five 
assumptions above, while a non-vegetarian accepts them but does not see why they imply 
vegetarianism. These two opponents of vegetarianism should be distinguished from a 
third distinct opponent, which I shall call “the agnostic meat-eater”. Unlike the anti-
vegetarian, agnostic meat-eaters do not positively reject one of these fundamental 
assumptions, but, unlike non-vegetarians, do not accept them either. Theirs is the position 
of those who wait for the compelling argument that would persuade them that these 
beliefs are justified, and they sees no reason to change their diet until such a justification 
is produced. Agnostic meat-eaters would charge vegetarians for holding (but not proving) 
basic beliefs that underlie their case, say, the belief that killing is a harm for the killed 
entity, or that pain is bad for the sufferer. While they do not deny these claims, and may 
even credits them with initial plausibility, the agnostic meat-eater would say that we 
cannot simply take the vegetarian’s word vouching for the truth of these, and that an 
argument is therefore needed. 
     We now have a typology of dismissals of moral vegetarianism. Let us now evaluate 
them in turn. I shall argue that anti-vegetarians seldom exist (for good reason); that the 
agnostic meat eater relies on an argumentative trick; and that non-vegetarians—the more 
probable opponents of vegetarians—should change their diet, given the fact that they 






                                                                                                                                                 
determine the legitimacy of such moves, and in the context of the vegetarian debate, I see nothing that 
makes the strategy flawed.  
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Anti-vegetarianism cannot be taken seriously. Disagreement exists as to what constitutes 
adequate justification, but as the euthanized puppies example shows, people do not 
believe that killing animals needs no justification whatsoever. It is also uncontested that 
some uses of animals constitute abuses of them and are to be prevented even when such 
prevention frustrates a strong human pleasure. Denying that animals feel pain (or that 
they are responding but unfeeling automata and are thus objects) has also become 
unpopular in post-Catersian bioethics: animals limp on hurt limbs, respond to painful 
stimuli, have endorphin (even some worms have that) and respond to pain relieving 
medication. Saying that this is “instinct” rather than “pain” as we know it in its human 
articulated form, is implausible since first, it implies that babies’ responses to painful 
stimuli are also “instinctive” rather than morally relevant ”pain”, and secondly, that 
human pain is divorced from the domain of instinct, and that something radically 
different is going on when humans and non-human animals are pricked by a needle.13  
Anti-vegetarians would have to work hard to unsettle such convictions, and it is difficult 
to imagine how they can do so. 
     An anti-vegetarian might deny that killing animals harms them, especially if it is done 
painlessly, and that it is thus not a wrong requiring justification. This too militates against 
commonsense as the obligation to justify any killing of animals is shared across cultures, 
and is at least as old as the book of Genesis. The obligation to justify killing is shared 
even by critics of pro-animal literature (though they of course challenged the specific 
cases wherein killing animals is justified). It is consensual then, that killing animals for 
no good reason even if it is painless is wrong. Why? Proposed answers include appeal to 
the shared intuition that killing an animal is wrong (exemplified, for example, by 
avoiding stepping on animals);14 or appeals to the loss of their experiential opportunities; 
or to the deprivation of achieving their potential; or appeals to the principle of 
                                                 
13 There is a more plausible, selective version of this argument, which denies the pain of “lower” animals, 
regarding these as no more than automata. I do not see much of a difference between a chicken and a crab, 
either in terms of death-perception, or the capacity to feel pain (I have my doubts about oysters, which 
strike me as thoroughly vegetative beings). But I sympathize with the general tendency within pro-
vegetarian literature to avoid fine-graining the argument, at least in this stage of the debate. For the 
evidence as to animal pain (including evidence for pain in “lower” animals) see DeGrazia, ibid, Ch. 5 and 
Bernard E. Rollin: The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science, Oxford UP: 
Oxford (1989).  
14 See Andrew Tardiff, “Simplifying the Case for Vegetarianism”, Social Theory and Practice, 22. 3 
(1996): 299-314 
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minimizing the pain which is inevitably involved in killing; or appealing to the 
opportunity of minimizing harm even when that harm does not involve pain (after 
defending the idea that a being can be harmed even if it cannot conceptualize the harm as 
present or impending harm); or saying that whatever makes us see the painless killing of 
people as harm cannot be limited to humans when one tries to explain why the painless 
killing of humans is wrong; or by saying that killing an animal takes from it all that it has 
(regardless of how this affects the overall calculus of pleasure and pain, that is, whether 
the animal can be replaced by another experiencing animal); or by saying that might can’t 
make right, and by appealing to fairness: that it is unfair that all you have is taken from 
you if this can be avoided.  
     Such answers have been mounted from different perspectives within pro-animal 
literature, and have been brought into conflict in the past since many pro-vegetarian 
authors disagree on the specific moral basis for diet reform. Since one goal of this essay 
is to show that vegetarianism need not be an outcome of broader considerations regarding 
the status of animals, I can afford to be eclectic here: unjustified killing of animals is 
wrong in all the senses above: it inevitably creates pain, it is an act of violence, it is 
probably wrong in many of the senses in which killing people for no substantial reason is 
wrong, it harms the animal by taking from it all that it has regardless of the pain it does or 
does not experience. Like other prima facie wrongs, this one too needs to be justified 
when it is done. Whether or not killing for food is a sufficient justification will be taken 
up later, but contesting the idea that killing animals harms them, as the anti-vegetarian 
claims, requires substantial arguments that can unsettle some very strong and widely 
shared conviction.  
     Someone can object here to my appeal to shared beliefs. Beliefs do not turn into truths 
when they are endorsed by a collective. This objection ignores the distinction I made 
between justifying claims and examining what follows from these claims assuming that 
they are held. Anti vegetarianism clashes with beliefs most of us hold. “Too bad for these 
beliefs” is a possible reply, but what does it mean in this context? Deny animal pain and 
you are there with pre-Darwinian bioethics. Dismiss pain’s moral relevance and you join 
company with all kinds of sadists. Peter Carruthers is admirably consistent when he 
claims that torturing a cat when one is unperceived is morally unproblematic (his 
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example is of a scientist that leaves earth on a spaceship and tortures her cat). Swallowing 
this horrifying counter-intuitive outcome of his own version of a direct/indirect duties 
approach (rather than seeing it as a reductio of it) is Carruthers’ own suggestion. Anti-
vegetarians will have to endorse a strange position of this kind on pain of inconsistency. 
Claiming that entities are not harmed when they are painlessly killed is a sophism: if it is 
invalid in the case of humans, why should it work in the case of animals (unless “harm” 
is a species-dependent notion, but why should it be?15).  
 
V 
      
How about agnostic meat-eaters? In the context of a philosophical debate, their kind of 
objection sounds lethal: no philosopher wants to sound as if her fundamental premises 
descended on her from heaven and that their truth is guaranteed by the divine aura with 
which they are endowed. Philosophers are in the business of justification, and so a 
demand for justification is never inappropriate. On the other hand, how does one argue 
that, for example, pain is bad or harms the sufferer, or that if an entity can be made to 
suffer, then things matter to it? Frey, for example, denies that suffering is a sufficient 
condition for ascribing interests to an entity on the ground that no one has given an 
argument showing that this is so. Now it may seem clear as day that if an entity is in great 
pain it is in a state that it wants to avoid. Things obviously matter to this entity, and in 
this sense, it has an interest in the termination of the pain. Frey does not deny the vivacity 
of this belief; he simply wants an argument for it.16   
     This answer is a trick. The agnostic meat-eater forces his opponent into an area which 
is an embarrassing one for all moral philosophy. One would want an answer that does 
more than points out morally basic intuitions (in our case, the intuition that pain is bad), 
as these can conflict, have no probative value, lack explanatory force and tend to be 
morally conservative. Everyone concedes that justifications must end somewhere. But the 
attempt to perceive some actions as making up the sphere of the good or the bad, just like 
                                                 
15 Some have argued that interests are linguistic, hence frustrating interests can only be done to a human. 
Even if this is true, the notion of harm is broader than interference with interests (e.g. babies can be harmed 
even when they lack language).  
16 R. G. Frey, Interests and Rights: The Case Against Animals, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1980), Ch. XI. 
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some color patches make up the sphere of what is designated by “yellow” (G. E. Moore’s 
analogy), involves a capacity for moral perception, an idea which was popular in the 
nineteenth century, but is no longer defended. So under the guise of requiring argument 
in the limited context of the vegetarian debate, the agnostic meat-eater is asking 
vegetarians to solve nothing less than the problem of basic beliefs in moral philosophy. 
Take for example, the belief that without some weighty justification, inflicting suffering 
is wrong. This judgment is “basic” in the sense that it is constitutive of the notion of 
wrong: if someone denies such a judgment, she either altogether lacks the concept of 
wrong, or is proposing a reform in ethics. But what is one to say if an argument in 
support of this judgment is required? 
     The position I find most plausible with regards to basic beliefs is sociological rather 
than argumentative: we are not argued into accepting the association between, say, 
unjustified inflicted suffering and wrong, but are socialized into it. We wish to avoid 
suffering ourselves. This affects our dealings with others, and directs us as to what they 
would wish to avoid or what they would perceive as harming them. Philosophers would 
typically not object to such a developmental account and to its systematization by a 
theory of moral development of one type or another (Kohlberg’s is the most empirically 
supported theory of moral development, and is consistent with this developmental 
account). But since someone can be socialized into Nazism too, philosophers would 
typically seek to avoid conflating between the descriptive and the normative accounts of 
moral development. Philosophers will ask for argumentative backing for such ground-
level preferences. Yet do we really have arguments why infliction of suffering on others 
requires justification? It seems that our “argument” is no more than our preference not to 
live in this way. Preferring to live in this way has reasons, and is thus rationally better 
than living in a world in which inflicting suffering can be done without reason. But an 
argument showing that A is rationally preferable to B should not be confused with an 
argument showing that B is wrong, which is what, in effect, the agnostic meat eater is 
asking for.17  
                                                 
17 A sociological explanation of this sort is philosophically disappointing, as it appears to replace 
argumentative justification with an explanation of genesis. Yet combing the classical ethical writings 
regarding basic beliefs does not yield better moves. Aristotle, Bentham, and Mill thought that some pains 
are bad or that some pleasures are good not through argument, but simply by virtue of these being objects 
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     I specified five widely shared beliefs regarding animals: the belief that killing them 
with no good reason even if this is painless is wrong; that they can experience pain; that 
their pain is morally relevant; that our dealings with them is morally different than our 
dealings with most objects; that their suffering should sometimes trump intense human 
pleasure. Denying these beliefs, as the anti-vegetarian does, is implausible. Agnostic 
meat-eaters ask for arguments for these beliefs before they would change their diet. The 
philosophically broad answer to this challenge is an argument for moral considerability of 
the type produced by Cavalieri, Regan, Bernstein and others.18 I am defending a narrower 
answer here: There is something basic and underived in repulsion felt to someone 
torturing an animal. This reaction has little to do with rights that the animal does or does 
not have (nor do I think that the repulsion to someone torturing a child is primarily about 
an infringement of rights). Each of the five beliefs is basic in this sense. Against the 
agnostic meat-eater I am claiming that asking for argumentative backing here is as 
plausible as asking for arguments in support of the belief that pain is (usually) bad. 
Agnostic meat-eating is an argumentative trick in this sense: it asks for arguments for 
beliefs that are reached through more immediate inputs. It can function as a reasonable 
critique of vegetarianism only if it makes sense to raise the problematic nature of basic 
moral beliefs in any area of applied ethics and proposed moral reform.  
                                                                                                                                                 
of positive or negative desire (this, as Bentham recognized, does not shut the door to animals). Kant’s 
second formulation of the categorical imperative—asking whether one wants to live in a world in which a 
certain practice is universalized—also appeals to basic unjustified preferences rather than to arguments. 
Moral philosophers do not like to admit that elaborate theories rest on conceptually basic desires or 
preferences. Many ethicists today lean to the Rawlsian approach to intuitions—we begin media res, with 
potentially replaceable considered judgments—and this already concedes that we have no better starting 
point than some conceptually primitive connections. Alternatively, one can try to resist intuitions 
altogether, in the manner of R. M. Hare. But even Hare does not manage to escape them (for example, he 
does not explain the positive value of preference satisfaction—the basic notion of his theory—holding it to 
be some observable given, like the way in which Mill or Aristotle relate to the pursuit of happiness. But 
what would distinguish in an informative way between observable givens and intuitions?) To pretend that 
we have, or must have, a better procedure else we promote an irrational morality is superficial, since it 
presumes that Utilitarians, Kantians, or Contractarians have somehow solved the basic belief problem and 
have managed to avoid intuitions (which they did not). A complaint of this kind is also insensitive to the 
various sifting that goes on with relation to basic moral inputs. Sifting prevents a crude foundationalism 
regarding intuitions (a “if you are strongly for/against it, you must be right” view).  
18 Cavalieri P. The Animal Question: Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights, C. Woollard Trans. 
2001, Oxford UP: New York; Bernstein, M. H. On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally 
Matters, 1998, Oxford: Oxford UP; Regan, T. The Case for Animal Rights, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982.  




      
If my argument so far is sound, non-vegetarianism should be the genuine position that a 
thoughtful opponent of moral vegetarianism should endorse. Non-vegetarians, I claimed, 
are those who opposes torturing animals and who would condemn euthanizing healthy 
animals for no reason. I claimed that these necessarily endorse the five beliefs above, and 
that therefore the important question between vegetarians and their opponents is not 
whether or not these beliefs are justified, but whether they imply that killing animals for 
food is wrong. So after discarding the objections of anti-vegetarians and the agnostic 
meat-eater, we can finally take on this question: is killing animals for food wrong, given 
these shared assumptions? 
            Evaluating the morality of killing animals for food begins then by breaking up 
“food” into its two components: nutrition and pleasure. Wide agreement exists as to the 
ability to have a fully nutritious vegetarian diet. Wide agreement exists as to the inability 
of such diet to compete with the culinary pleasure afforded by a non-vegetarian diet. This 
clarifies the moral issue, which is no longer the moral status of killing animals for food, 
but killing animals for the unique and irreplaceable culinary pleasure that eating them 
affords. In his Animal Rights and Wrongs, Roger Scruton draws a distinction that avoids 
the unpleasant sound that killing for pleasure has (he is discussing angling), saying that 
one does not kill for fun (which connotes sadism), but that the killing is the price of fun.19 
Scruton’s point is a good one: angling, hunting, or eating animal flesh are not sadistic. 
And this is why the description I choose is “killing for pleasure”, rather than “killing for 
sadistic pleasure”. 
     Let us begin with pleasure. The distinct, irreplaceable, and at times intense pleasure of 
eating animal flesh need not be denied. Animal flesh not only opens up numerous 
culinary possibilities, but also functions as a focus of many kinds of social and religious 
activities like the outdoor barbecue and the Christmas turkey. All such pleasures are 
denied to vegetarians, who instead become social spoilsports who force non-vegetarians 
to change the traditional character of some of these. Some vegetarians will say that in 
                                                 
19 Metro Books: London, (third edition) 2000, p. 119.   
Between the Species IV August 2004 www.cla.calpoly.edu/bts/ 
 17
their own internal hedonistic calculus, these losses are balanced against a new kind of 
pleasure, involving a sense of moral completeness and perhaps even purity that comes 
with doing the right thing.20 Yet for other vegetarians (such as myself) such talk is too 
abstract, and their moral choice is experienced as a downright loss. Personally, I am even 
put off by vegetarians that seem to never have had much of a zeal for eating meat, and 
lose sympathy when I read passages in the writings of moral vegetarians in which 
“vegetarian cuisine” is praised over its immoral alternative. The unhedonistic (and 
therefore humanly narrow) perspective regarding the meaning of eating that sometimes 
animates such writings—R. M. Hare admits that he and his wife hardly eat out and so his 
demi-vegetarianism is not difficult for him—alienates vegetarians such as myself, who 
have had very intense experiences in eating (as well as cooking) meat, and thus 
experience their own moral choice as extracting a high price indeed.  
     Does the harm involved in killing animals trump such loss? The superficial way of 
framing this question is in terms of moral values as opposed to pleasures. The 
superficiality rests on the way by which casting the question in this way plays into the 
hands of the vegetarian. Since pursuing moral values typically involves curtailing 
pleasures or the pursuit of pleasures, highlighting the pleasures of eating animal flesh is 
simply beside the point: a case for moral vegetarianism need not be required to show that 
vegetarianism is the happiest or most pleasurable way to live, but that it is the moral way 
to do so even if it does prescribe tough limitations. People who justify eating animal flesh 
through saying that the pleasure this gives them overrides the wrong done to animals 
have, in effect, conceded the moral claims of the vegetarians.  
     The deeper way of framing the question is not in terms of a value-pleasure opposition, 
but in terms of conflicting values. Pleasures are not necessarily distinct from values. 
Some pleasures are goods, the pursuit of which is a value. Culinary values need not be 
moral values. But they still need to be considered as values (rather than pleasures) that 
compete with the value of avoiding eating animal flesh. Commensurating pleasures and 
                                                 
20 Here is, for example, Mohandas Gandhi: “…there is something much higher which calls us to 
vegetarianism….I would just emphasize the moral basis of vegetarianism. And I would say that I have 
found from my own experience, and the experience of thousands of friends and companions, that they find 
satisfaction, so far as vegetarianism is concerned, from the moral basis they have chosen for sustaining 
vegetarianism.” From “Diet and Morality” in Ethical Vegetarianism: From Pythagoras to Peter Singer, K. 
S. Walters and L. Portmess (Ed), S.U.N.Y. Press: Albany, 1999, p.144. 
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deprivations (or balancing pleasures against values or values against conflicting values) is 
notoriously difficult to explicate. We daily make such evaluations on a private as well as 
institutional level without a unified theory regarding how we do this. When they are 
questioned, our preferences ultimately lack probative force. Avoiding killing humans for 
fun is today a trivial judgment in which one compares values and pleasures. Gladiator-
fighting shows that people did appear to take pleasure in fights to the death. Can this 
pleasure of many be trumped by the value of the lives of gladiators? A contemporary 
would say that it can, and that no pleasure or aggregate pleasure of this kind justifies the 
death of another. Such pleasures are immoral and what is not immoral in their pursuit can 
be replaced by non-deadly sports. Suppose now, that a hypothetical defender of fights to 
the death would deny that such substitutes provide the same intense pleasure that fights to 
the death involve (the analogy to the vegetarian issue being claims of the “Nothing done 
to tofu will compete with a juicy steak” sort). We cannot simply demand that he give up 
his pleasure, if he challenges us to explain why the death involved in the practices he 
loves overrides the pleasures of many. We can appeal to notions like rights or the sanctity 
of life. But these make no sense in a non-egalitarian setting and will strike him as dubious 
and forced innovations. His judgments will probably resemble those who today reject the 
applications of notions like rights to animals. The argument would probably stop there.  
     This impasse shows that comparative judgments as to conflicting values or goods lack 
probative force, and that they spring from a rich matrix of sensitivities that do not exist 
universally. Rejecting the moral status of gladiator fighting from a contemporary 
perspective is much easier than doing so from within a cultural outlook that has not yet 
devised an egalitarian outlook and the sensitivity to importance of human life. But this is 
a practical difference. On the level of rational debate the impasse is as fierce. What can 
one say to a defender of fights to the death? What constitutes a good argument showing 
that the pleasure of such sports cannot outweigh the harm they involve? We reach 
foundational issues in ethics: the probative status of evaluations; their convention-related 
status vs. a possible trans-convention implicit structure from which they emerge; whether 
persuading a radical dissenter is a plausible test for a moral position; what constitutes 
proof in ethics; the possible justification for reforming present practices and sentiments. I 
will not plunge into these. Analogous past cases in which curtailing benefits and 
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pleasures from one large group of entities because such involves overwhelming harm to 
another group, did not proceed from discovering a solution to the foundational problems 
of ethics. Egalitarian social movements succeed primarily due to numerous pragmatic 
contingencies. Their moral case is substantiated through tapping on to sentiments that 
sometimes need to be created, until the claims they make turn from idiosyncratic 
preaching into vivid and action guiding prescriptions. Vegetarianism is in the same boat 
as pre-nineteenth century feminism or early eighteenth century abolitionism: the 
sentiments that can change the preferences within the privileged group so that the harm 
done will be perceived as overwhelming in relation to the benefits gained are non-
existent or weak.  
      The upshot of all this is that one cannot prove that killing animals for the pleasure 
involved in eating them is wrong. One can show that killing vs. pleasure is the actual 
equation. One can then point to the continuity between vegetarianism and other social 
causes that we typically regard as encapsulating and promoting moral progress, in which 
overwhelming harm justifies limiting pleasures.21 And yet, there is one advance I think 
we can make given this paper's emphasis on participation in my proposed formulation of 
moral vegetarianism. The focus on participation forces the non-vegetarian to think of 
each ac of eating animal flesh as participation in one application of the killing-vs.-
pleasure equation, with reference to a particular animal’s death and a particular pleasure 
this involves. Most meals are uneventful, they may be pleasurable but do not involve 
intense pleasure, yet do involve animal death. When eating is regarded as a form of 
participation, it becomes psychologically and morally harder to defend regular mundane 
animal flesh eating. As for overwhelmingly pleasurable acts of animal flesh eating, here 
                                                 
21 It is many times noted that pro-animal literature appeals to similarities between liberating animals and 
egalitarian social movements. Early writings in the modern version of the pro-animal movement in the 
Seventies have done much to press the analogy here (Ryder and Singer on speciesism are the best 
examples). Note that the argument over this analogy has several layers: first, an egalitarian outlook has 
little to do with the empirical fact of an actual equality in capacity between the privileged and non-
privileged class. Second, systematic bias against a class of entities usually depends on erroneously 
regarding a difference between the entities to have moral significance. Third (the point I am making 
above), a concern for justice in these cases, always carries a price, a curtailing of certain pleasures within 
the privileged class.  For a detailed defense of the idea that reforming animal related practices cannot and 
need not be proved, rather, it is to be predicated on such reform being continuous with other moral 
concerns, such as fairness, minimizing suffering, and developing a better character, see S. F. Sapontzis, 
Morals, Reason, and Animals, Temple UP: Philadelphia, 1987. 
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things depend on the psychological clarity of the equation: vegetarians are just more 
vividly aware of the animal-death side of it.  
      
VII 
 
Leahy, Scruton and Hare have argued that collective vegetarianism involves the 
inexistence of billions of potential animals and the possible extinction of species that 
would not exist if there will be no financial incentive to bread them.22 This argument is 
often used in conversation; the attempt being to embarrass the vegetarian into admitting 
that the opponent’s eating practices are a positive good to the killed animals thus 
reversing the moral poles of the debate. If collective vegetarianism is bad for animals, 
then personal vegetarianism which appeals to the immorality of killing for eating (rather 
than only a protest against modalities of rearing and killing) is counterproductive from 
the stand point of animals, and is thus predicated on the wrong ideal and is to be 
dismissed. Call this the eating-animals-benefits-them argument, or EABT for short. Here 
is Hare’s version of EABT: 
 
From the point of view of such a [roughly utilitarian] theory it would 
seem that the issue about killing animals, as distinct from causing them 
suffering, resolves itself into, not the question of whether it is all right 
to kill animals, but the question of how many lives animals, of different 
species including the human, we ought to cause there to be…What we 
ought to be doing is to maximize the amount of quality-adjusted life 
years…of sentient beings. And I do not believe that we should be doing 
this if we refrained from eating animals. The reason is that if we gave 
up eating animals the market for meat would vanish, and no more 
animals would be raised for meat-production…This thought gives me 
pause when I walk in the fields around my home in England and see a 
great many apparently happy animals, all destined to be eventually 
eaten…In our village there is also a trout farm. The fish start their lives 
in moderately commodious ponds and have what I guess is a pleasant 
life for fish, with plenty to eat. In due course they are lifted out in 
buckets and put immediately into tanks in the farm buildings. 
Purchasers select their fish, which is the killed by being banged smartly 
on the head and handed to the customer. I am fairly certain that, if 
                                                 
22 Leahy, M. P. T, Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective, Routledge: London & New York 
(1991): 210).  R. M. Hare: “Why I am Only a Demi-Vegetarian”, Essays on Bioethics, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, (1993) 219-236; Scruton ibid.  
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given the choice, I would prefer the life, all told, of such a fish to that 
of almost any fish in the wild, and to non-existence.23
 
  
     I cite this argument at length, because it convinces many philosophers. Hare is 
actually running together two distinct questions: the first involves the benefits of being 
raised for food from the standpoint of the animal in comparison to non-existence 
(conceived of both on the level of the individual animal being killed, and the level of 
entire species which would not exist without human interest). The second relates to 
killing by human hand, which can be better for the animal than “natural” death.       
     Let us begin with being killed by humans (as opposed to being brought into existence 
by humans and then killed by them). This argument is sometimes made with regards to 
hunting: it is said that the hunted animal is better off being killed by hunters or their dogs 
than the kinds of death that await it in the wild. This version of EABT is a pretense. Hare 
is not saying that killing the trout is a benefit for it now. Being “smartly” clubbed is 
obviously not in the interest of the trout (as Hare is imagining a healthy trout; not one 
which is in pain, or dying through other harsh means, or is about to be eaten by an 
impending larger fish). An already existing animal has an obvious interest to prolong its 
life, assuming it is healthy and not suffering from some other cause, and so killing cannot 
be a benefit for it. So the killing itself is rarely a benefit, and when one fleshes out a case 
for a killing which is a genuine benefit to the animal, one reaches criteria resembling 
those of euthonized pets which are mostly killed for their own good. In fact, since 
humans are highly successful voluntary predators—“voluntary” in the sense that they do 
not have to hunt foxes or fish—these creatures would be relieved to hear that such 
hunting is eliminated, and that they have so many less predators to worry about (recall 
that EABT asks us to hypothesize regarding what benefits animals).  
     But Hare’s argument with regards to the fish is somewhat different: being raised and 
killed for human consumption makes for an overall better life for the trout than being a 
fish in the wild, or simply a non existing fish. This is the more popular version of EABT. 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 227-8. Pro-animal literature did not fail to mention the structural similarity of such claims to past 
justifications of slavery: “ [The abolition of slavery] would be extreme cruelty to the African savages, a 
potion of whom it saves from massacre, or intolerable bondage in their own country, and introduces into a 
much happier state of life.” Citation ascribed to James Boswell, and is given in M. Spiegel’s The Dreaded 
Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery, Mirror Books: USA (1996): 73.  
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Against this one can obviously challenge the plausibility of arguing from the relative 
good of non-existent entities. But I shall avoid this line and assume that it makes sense to 
say that an entity benefits from being brought into existence. Vegetarians deal with it 
through analogous thought experiments with regards to potential humans which will be 
victimized through practices that would, at the same time, bring them into existence. If 
these analogies are valid, the vegetarian reply is a refutation of EABT. This is because 
with regards to humans, the benefits of being created cannot justify a practice in which 
one is created so as to be a victim. We would have no problem judging immoral a 
pedophilic society that brings some children to the world with the specific purpose of 
sexually exploiting them—providing them with otherwise pleasant living conditions—
and then killing them painlessly when they mature and lose their sexual appeal, justifying 
the exploitation and killing through the benefits of being born; banning a reform on the 
pretense that it would prescribe non-existence to these children. Or consider human 
cloning for the purpose of creating people that live pleasant and short lives, functioning 
as organ banks that would not exist without this purpose. These practices will not get 
justified through an appeal to the benefits of creating the victims from the perspective of 
these victims.  
     An advocate of EABT will either drop EABT as plausible justification, or say that 
there is a disanalogy between human and non-human animals. The claim being that 
human life has a different kind of value, and the considerations that go into killing people 
are different than those that are operative in the case of animals and so the justification 
does not carry over from non-human animals to human animals. The defender of EABT 
now turns out to be saying that given the different kind of value that animal life has, the 
benefits of being born justify taking its life later. This position does not deny that it is in 
the interest of potential exploited children or cloned people to be born rather than not to 
exist (assuming, again, that such comparative judgements make sense). Yet it holds that 
unlike animal life, the value of human life is irreducible to this interest.  
     Dissociating interest and value in this way is perhaps what is meant by the attribution 
of “sacredness” to human life. The secular rendering of sacredness is that the value of 
human life is non-instrumental: it does not reside in life being just a means for 
opportunities, experiences, or actualizing one’s potential. And so the defender of EABT 
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appears to hold that the value of human life is not only distinct, but also overrides all 
these other ends in the sense that some positive experiences and some actualization of 
one’s potential will not justify existence. The defender of EABT will then go on to say 
that animals’ lives are different. They are not sacred, and do have mere instrumental 
value. Unfortunately, all this leads the defender of EABT to a weird result. The inferior 
and instrumental value of animal life gets potential animals some benefits over less 
fortunate potential human animals: animals get to exist, flourish and die whereas 
potential humans are so valuable that they can’t exist at all. 
    This outcome is surprising; but one can still accept it. Being special has its limitations 
and not existing, even when such existence is in one’s interest, is one of them. But the 
strange result calls for thoughts about the valuation of life that lead to it. The thought 
experiments above could be construed in ways that turn the lives of potential exploited 
children or cloned organ downers into partly pleasant ones. Since such practices do 
benefit their potential victims, explicating what is morally wrong with them relates to the 
ambivalence of “worth”: short of extreme scenarios, most lives are worth living from the 
perspective of the potential beings who will live them since some positive experiential 
value overrides no value. At the same time life’s value is not decided solely through this 
internal perspective. Virtually all lives are worth living; yet, some lives should not be 
lived. This dual evaluation of life’s value is not limited to humans, as no one holds that it 
is justified to bring animals to the world so as to torture them to death after they lead 
several years of pleasant living. Raising animals for food need not be similar to torturing 
them. But the torture analogy shows that it is not enough to point out the prudential 
benefit a practice has for the purpose of its evaluation, as evaluation involves a second, 
qualitative component which EABT leaves out. When the dual aspect of life’s evaluation 
is recognized, it is no longer sufficient to point out the benefit of living from the 
standpoint of the animal. This undermines the EABT argument, which rests on prudential 
considerations alone.24
                                                 
24 In my “Veganism” (see note 8 above) I enter further into the considerations that determine life’s value. 
Briefly, apart from the quantitative and qualitative dimensions (that is, whether a life is or is not lived and 
its quality) I specify a teleological dimension: that is, some qualitatively reasonable lives should not be 
lived, as some ends for lives that are lived pervert or present a mis-recognition regarding what having a life 
means.  
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     The problems of employing EABT do not end there. EABT also prescribes a too 
conservative stance with regards to factory farming, a stance which Hare and Scruton 
would not like to adopt since both would like to see factory farms reformed. By reducing 
to a minimum the price of raising animals and thus making meat cheaper and affordable 
for many consumers, factory farms enable many more animals to exist than the number 
of animals got through traditional farming. Stop factory farming or substantially reform 
the animals’ quality of life, and you diminish the number of existing animals, probably by 
millions. Factory farming prescribes harsh lives for animals; though it is somewhat better 
than, say, a life of non-stop torture and is surely better than nothing. An obtuse owner of 
a factory farm would use EABT not only to justify eating meat, but also to prevent 
qualitative reform involving reduction of animal suffering: the claim will be that any such 
reduction in suffering is uneconomical and so would lead to reduction of many lives of 
potential animals (consider the financial implications of requiring that laying hens have 
more room to move around in large scale poultry farming). If eating animals benefits 
them, then raising them in the most financially efficient way is in their favor too. It is 
even possible that the quality of living in such factories should be reduced, thus enabling 
even more animals to exist (preventing any movement at all for chickens rather then just 
limiting their movement severely may enable such factories to double or triple the 
amount of living chickens). No philosopher who has taken the trouble to examine the 
particularities of factory farming accepts this conclusion.25
     Aside from this, EABT also has an interesting flip-side: if killing animals for food and 
eating them is truly held to be a benefit to these animals because such practice brings 
them into existence, the inverse holds too: animals which can thrive without humans 
breeding them, say, fish, should not be eaten as such killing has nothing to do with their 
benefit. The same holds for cows and hens which would still exist in large numbers even 
if they are not killed for food as the incentive to raise them for eggs and milk will 
preserve them in large numbers. And so this objection to vegetarianism actually goes 
some way in furthering the aims of moral vegetarians, and these implications should be 
                                                 
25 Hare, it is true, is speaking of “quality adjusted life years” not simply of existence. But the obtuse farmer 
I am imagining will say that a hen’s life in a crowded cage is better than no life, and since Hare is not 
explicating how negative quality is to be weighed against the benefits of existence it is not clear how Hare 
can respond.  
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pointed out whenever the argument is used in a genuine way rather than a mean for 




EABT aside, we still need to face the question of the desirability of a vegetarian utopia 
from the standpoint of animals. Suppose that farm animal husbandry is reformed, that 
factory farming is abolished, that animals are only killed for their own benefit or when 
they endanger people. Suppose that laying hens are still raised for eggs, cows for milk, 
and that all such animals are raised in non-crowded farms which are encouraged to invest 
in raising these animals for these products, but are also supervised by independent 
officials that are in charge of the welfare of the animals (rather than veterinarians that are 
paid by the farmers). Such animals are killed only when they are old, wounded, or ill, and 
in some cases are then eaten or sold as food; their bodies used for the production of 
numerous products like leather or pet food. There is nothing so far immoral in such a 
world. But what prospects does such world hold for bulls, male chicks, or hogs in 
general, which have no such “goods” to deliver, and which are today not raised at all (in 
the case of virtually all male chicks which are killed upon birth) or are raised only for 
their flesh (as are the calf and the pig)?  
     Presenting in detail a vegetarian ideal is a theoretical challenge; not a practical one. 
The question is whether vegetarian theory is flawed since it is predicated on an ideal 
which is a bad one for some farm animals (there might come a time where the question 
becomes a practical one, but for us the question is merely theoretical). Is collective 
vegetarianism bad for some animals? One possible answer is that if the choice is between 
exploiting some animals and the non-existence of these animals, a moral world should 
opt for the latter, and that the vegetarian ideal world will not inhabit any of these animals: 
the cow, the pig and the chicken will follow the dodo. But milder solutions are possible. 
Selective artificial insemination can solve some problems—at least for poultry and 
cattle—by the time that collective vegetarianism will pose a real “threat”, should that 
time ever come. Artificial insemination is widely practiced today with regards to cattle 
and turkey, and more recently made possible in chickens. Semen differentiation as part of 
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these practices is not technologically inconceivable (it exists for humans), and would 
solve the moral problems involved in the birth of “unproductive” males while preserving 
the species. Short of this, vegetarian legislation, should that ever happen, can make the 
killing of “non-productive” animals illegal, and require that the cost of raising them along 
with their “more productive” sisters be shared by the consumers of eggs, milk, leather 
and wool. Indeed, such “compensation” to these animals—conceived of as kinds rather 
than individuals—can morally justify the use to which they are put and answer the moral 
worries of vegans: without eggs, milk and posthumous use of their bodies these animals 
along with their many brothers (in the case of chickens, more than half of chicks are 
“useless” males) would not exist at all.   
     The vegetarian utopia’s real problem (and somewhat ironic in the case of a paper 
written by a Jew) is with pigs. Negative ecological consequences of setting some pigs 
free at various points in the planet and letting them have their opportunity of surviving as 
a wild species may outweigh the envisaged benefits, even if this option is at all feasible. 
Keeping the species alive through confining some of them in zoos is a solution only 
under the assumption that zoos themselves are morally justified institutions. Recent 
literature toys with the idea of “positive obligations” or “negative responsibility” to 
animals, the idea being a duty to benefit animals rather than focusing on the obligation 
not to harm them.26 Such ideas may base an obligation to save an endangered species, 
especially one that, like pigs, has been heavily exploited. Of course, conceiving of such 
degrees of charitable behavior in a world where human lives, misery, illness and poverty 
are routinely ignored is a fantasy, but again, the issue is theoretical; not practical, and the 
thoughts on positive obligation do point to a solution, in which it will be the 
responsibility of humans to create conditions that allow pigs to somehow survive. Pigs 
present the same moral problem as do lab mice that remain healthy after they have been 
experimented on, and are today killed by the thousands since they lose their ability to be 
used for further experimentation. One cannot ask scientists to set these free in “the wild”. 
Yet we can probably do better than gas healthy mice in Co2 tanks, as is routinely done 
now.   
                                                 
26 David DeGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status, Cambridge UP, 1996, pp. 
272-278; Martha Nussbaum, “Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis”, Harvard Law Review, 
114. 5 (2001): 1506-1549. 
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     Collective vegetarianism will not involve extinction to species that are exploited 
today. The cow, chicken and pig will exist. The reduction in number in some of these 
species would only correct the artificial growth in the number of lives that should not be 
lived, and are lived now. This artificial growth is the outcome of systematic, objectifying 
human exploitation that is such an ordinary fact of our surroundings that it requires an 
effort to be perceived. It is our business to correct this, and it is in our capacity to do so.   
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